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The above entitled cases are distinct and separate 
suits. By order of the court they have been consolidated 
for hearing. This brief covers the· £acts and argument for 
Loth cases. The cases are similar but not identical and 
the <lifferences will be pointed out in the Statement of 
11,aets and in the argument. 
S'TATEMENT OF F'AC'TS 
I)laintiffs have filed their complaints asking for 
'vrit~ Q_f mandate to compel the defendant E. Allen Bate·-
,--- . ----·-----
111an to 'vithdraw a ruling that plaintiffs may not be em-
ployed by their respective Boards of Education and to 
compel such Boards to enter into written contracts with 
plaintiffs for the school year 1953-1954. Defendants who 
are represented by the Attorney General have filed an-
swers. The essential facts relied upon by the plaintiffs 
are admitted by the defendants and the questions pre-
sented are substantially matters of law. 
From the complaints and the answers of the defend-
ants the following are the undisputed facts: 
(a) BACKMAN VS. BATEMAN, et al. 
Defendant Board of Education of Salt Lake City is a 
municipal corporation of the State of Utah whose bound-
aries are co-extensive with Salt Lake City and the Board 
has the statutory function of administering the school 
system in Salt Lake City. :The defendant E. Allen Bate-
man is the State Superintendent of Public Instruction of 
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the State of Utah and as ·such is the executive officer of 
the State Board of Education, which Board is charged 
'vith the general superintendence of district schools. As 
such Superintendent he advises with school officers upon 
n1atters inYolving the \Yelfare of schools and when re-
quested he Inust give \Yritten answers to school officeTs 
upon all questions concerning school law. This legal obli-
gation is specifically provide·d for by Section 53-3-4, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as follows: 
''Decisions by superintendent- Validity. -
The state superintendent shall advise with super-
intendents and with school boards and other school 
officers upon all matters involving the welfare· of 
the schools. He shall when requested by super-
intendents or other school officers give them writ-
ten ansvv-ers to all questions concerning the· school 
law. His decisions shall be held to be correct and 
final until set aside by a court of competent juris-
diction or by subsequent legislation." 
The plaintiff Ralph V. Backman is a professional 
teacher and has bee·n employed by the defendant Board 
of Education from 1926 to and including the school year 
1952-1953. His employment has been as a teacher or 
supervisor, and since 1948 as the principal of South 
High ·school. During all of this time he has held a certi-
ficate issued by the State Board of Education as. a requi-
site to his being employed in the various capacities. At 
the present time he holds a certificate of school adminis-
tration which expires June 30, 1956. These certificates 
are issued upon requisites. of merit as provided in Chap-
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ter 2, Title 53, Utah c·ode Annotated 1953, and the Rules 
and Regulations of the State Board of Education. The 
laws of the State of Utah (Section 53-2-21) provide that 
no persons shall teach in a public school (which includes 
Ptnployntent as a principal) in any school district unless 
lu~ has the required certificate from the State Board of 
11~ducation. The plaintiff has spent a great deal of time 
qualifying hi1nself for his profession, having received an 
A.B. degree fro1n the University of Utah, an M.A. degree 
fron1 Stanford University, taken postgraduate work con-
sisting of 7 4lj2 "quarter hours" at Stanford University, 
28 '"quarter hours" at the lTniversity of Utah and 18 
""quarter hours" at l~tah State Agricultural College. 
Under the rules and regulations plaintiff must take cer-
tain minimum courses of study during each five-year 
period in order to receive a renewal of his certificate. 
Defendant Board of Education employs all of its 
teachers, supervisors and principals under an annual 
\vritten contract and has a tenure policy of renewal of 
these contracts when its teaching personnel (including 
principals) are doing entirely satisfactory work. Plain-
tiff's contract expired with the school year 1952-19153 and 
he applied for reemployment for the school year 1953-
1954. He was recommended for reemployment by the 
S-uperintendent of Salt Lake City schools, and the defend-
ant Board of Education at a regular meeting accepted 
the recommendation of its superintendent and voted to 
employ the plaintiff for the school year 1953-1954. A 
question being raised as to the legality of the employment 
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of plaintiff, a contrart 'Yas not entered into by the de-
fendant Board of Education. Pursuant to the above men-
tioned statutory provision (Section 53-3-4) an opinion a.s 
to the legality of employn1ent of the· plaintiff was sub-
nlitted to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction. 
The factual situation necessitating this opinion is that 
plaintiff is a brother of Le·Grand P. Backman who now 
is and sinee 1939 has been a me·mber of the Board of 
Education of Salt Lake City. LeGrand P. Backman did 
not vote upon the question of the employment of the plain-
tiff. Exhibits ~~ D" and "E" are the letters addressed to 
the State Superintendent and his answer regarding the 
question of employment of plaintiff. As appears from 
these exhibits the State· Superintendent, on the advice· 
of the Attorney General, gave the opinion that plaintiff 
could not be employed by the Salt Lake City Board of 
Education. Plaintiff was then notified that upon the ·sole 
ground of the opinion of the State Superintende·nt he 
would not be employed for the coming school year. Ex-
hibit "F" is the letter addressed to plaintiff so advising 
him. 
Under Section 53-6-8, Utah C'Ode Annotated 1953, 
it is provided that the· members. of each board of educa-
tion shall fix their own compensation to be received for 
their services and that such -compensation shall not 
exceed $100.00 per year in city ·school districts. The 
Board of Education of Salt Lake City has fixed its 
compensation for the year 1953-1954 at $100.00 per 
annum. 
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There were approximately 125 teachers employed 
1n the State of Utah during the school year 1952-195-3 
\vho~P vosition with regard to employment for the school 
yPar 195:3-1954 is the same as that of the plaintiff and 
who will be unable to secure employment under the 
ruling of the defendant f)uperintendent E. Allen Bate-
nlan. Nubstantially every school district in the state 
1s affected by the ruling of the State Superintendent. 
Plaintiff has been employed by the defendant Board 
of Education for 27 years and during such period he 
has become familiar with the practices, problems and 
procedures of the Salt Lake City Board, has an estab-
lished good will with such defendant, and plaintiff may 
not be able to secure employ1nent in another school dis-
trict. It is also admitted that no other district in the 
State of Utah has a high school of comparable size with 
the high schools of Salt Lake City and no other district 
pays as high a salary for the position of principal of a 
high school. Plaintiff is 49 years of age, has been a 
resident of Salt Lake City all of his life, has five children 
and owns his own home in Salt Lake City. There is 
established in the Salt Lake City School District a Local 
Public School Teachers' Retir.ement Association of which 
every teacher employed under a written contract by the 
Board of Education is by law a member. :The funds for 
said retirement association are supplied by deductions 
from the salaries of teachers, such deductions at the 
present time being ·2% on a maximum of $2,500.00 and 
by an equal amount paid into the association by the 
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Board of Education. Plaintiff has contributed to such 
association during all the tilne he has been e·mploye·d by 
the defendant Board and to be eligible for retirement 
benefits fron1 the association he Inust ha:ve taught 30 
years and must be a member of the association at the 
time of retirement. If he is not employed he is not a 
1nember of the association. Retirement benefits at the! 
present tune are $600.00 per annum. If plaintiff cannot 
continue his employment by defendant Board of Educa-
tion all benefits of the Local Teachers' Retirement Asso-
ciation, including the an1ounts plaintiff has paid into the 
association will be lost. 
(b) TANNER VS. BATEMAN, et al. 
In the case of Tanner :vs. E. Allen Bate1nan and the 
Board of Education of Ogden ·City, the facts are similar to 
the Backman case except as to the following matters. 
The Boa.rd of Education of Ogdern City has voted that 
the members shall receive no pay for the fiscal arnd school 
year 1953-1954. Mr. T'anner holds a life diploma issue·d 
by the State Board of Education which needs no renewal 
and can be canceled only for cause or the failure of Mr. 
Tanner to be employed as a teacher for a period of fi:ve 
years. The Board of Education of Ogden City, as in the 
case of Salt Lake· 'City, has a Local T'eachers' Retirement 
Association. Unless plaintiff is a member of the asso-
ciation at the time of retirement he will lose all benefits 
of the association including the amounts paid in by him. 
T·ermination of employment terminates membership. 
Payments at the present time are 1% of $2,500.00 per 
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annmn and the retirement benefits now being paid are 
$~80.00 per year. Mr. Tanner is 61 years of age, has 
taught continuously since 1922, and has taught a total 
of 33Y2 years all of which has been in the Ogden s.chools. 
He i~ now teaching only the subject of biology in which 
subject he has specialized, and it is only in the large·r 
s<·hools that a teacher can be e1nployed to teach one 
subject exclusively. 
In the Ogden School District and generally through-
out the State of Utah teachers' pay is on a basis of 
seniority, and l\fr. Tanner has reached the maximum 
pay per1nitted by reason of seniority. If he cannot con-
tinue his employment in Ogden City and secures employ-
ment as a teacher in another district he will lose a portion 
of this seniority and will receive less than the maximum 
pay. 
Plaintiff Mathias C. Tanner is a brother to N. Rus-
sell Tanner who has been a member of the Board of 
Education of Ogden City since 1945. N. Russell Tanner 
did not participate in or vote upon the question of 
employment of Mathias C. Tanner for the school year 
1953-1954. Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" are similar in 
form and substance to Exhibits "D", "E" and "F'" in the 
Backman case. 
The question rn both cases is whether or not the 
plaintiffs may be employed in the school districts of Salt 
Lake City and O·gden respectively. It is the contention of 
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both plaintiffs that if they may not be so employed they 
have been denied a right to "vhich they are entitled and 
from w·hich they have been unlawfully excluded by the 
defendants. 
Both plaintiffs have met all requirements for 
en1ployment by the defendant boards and the question 
is whether such e1nployment is illegal by reason of the 
1953 amenmnent to Section 52-3-1, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, being Senate Bill 235. Plaintiffs contend that they 
are not prohibite·d from the employment by such amend-
ment and that by the ruling of defendant E. Allen Bate-
man and the refusal of defendant boards of education 
they have been denied a right to which they are entitled 
and from which they have been unlawfully excluded. 
(!tallies throughout this brief are plaintiffs'.) 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED· UPON 
I. THE ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AS APPLIED TO TEACHERS AND OTHER 
EMPLOYEES OF BOARDS OF EDUCATION REQUIRED 
BY LAW TO HOLD CERTIFICATES ISSUED BY THE 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
(a) Question involved is one of police power of the 
state und,er the state a.nd federal constitutions. 
(b) Plaintiff has a.n established and vested right to 
seek employm.ent and make contracts in amy 
school district of the state, which right may not 
be interfere_d with by statute. 
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(c) The control arnd supervision of the public sc·hool 
system is by our constitution vested in the State 
Board of Education and the anti-nepotism law 
is in conflict with such provision. 
(d) ~There is no necessity in the interest of the public 
welfare for a;n anti-nepotism statute which pro-
hiiYlts the employm-ent of teachers and other per-
sownel required by law to hold certificates issued 
by the J.S1tate Board of Education. 
(e) The anti-nepotism law is arbitrary and oppres-
sive and unduly restricts the liberty of plaintiffs 
guaranteed by the state and federal constitu-
tions. 
II. ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
SO AS NOT TO APPLY TO TEACHERS AND OTHER 
EMPLOYEES OF BOARDS OF EDUCATION REQUIRED 
BY LAW TO HAVE CERTIFICATES OR DIPLOMAS IS-
SUED BY THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
(a) If so construed the anti-nepotism statute is in 
conflict with Section 53-2-15, Utah Code A'YIIfbo-
tated 1953. 
(b) Statutes must be construed in the light of their 
intent and purposes. 
(c) Where there are two possible construc;tions to 
be given a statute one of which resUlts in the 
statute being held unconstitutional, the alterna-
tive construction should be given. 
III. WHERE BOARD OF EDUCATION RECEIVES NO PAY 
THE ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE IS UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL AS APPLIED TO TEACHERS AND OTHER 
EMPLOYEES OF BOARDS OF EDUCATION REQUIRED 
BY LAW TO HOLD CERTIFICATES ISSUED BY THE 
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
For convenience· we have divided this argument into 
subheadings (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e). We think there 
is a logical segregation of points but the matters are 
necessarily overlap·ping and authorities cited under one 
of these subdivisions may be persuasive under another 
subdivision or under all of them. 
(a) Question involved is one of police power of the 
state under the state and federal constitutions. 
The anti-nepotism statute provides as follows: 
"52-3-1. Employment of relatives prohibi-
ted.-It is unlawful for any person holding any 
position the compensation for which is paid out 
of public funds to retain in employment or to 
employ, appoint, or vote for the ap·pointment of, 
his or her father, mother, husband, wife, son, 
daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, 
niece, first cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law, 
brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law or daugh-
ter-in-law in or to any position or employment, 
when the salary, wages, pay or compensation of 
such appointee, is to be paid out of any public 
funds; and it is unlawful for such appointee to 
accept or to retain such employment in all cases 
where the direct power of employment or appoint-
ment to such position is or can be exercised by any 
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person within the degress of consanguinity or 
affinity herein specified, or by a board or group 
of which such person is a member." 
Se(~tion 1, Article I of our State C·onstitution pro-
vides: 
"All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties 
" 
Section 7, Article I of ou~ State Constitution pro-
vides; 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law." 
Amendment XIV of the Federal Constitution pro-
vides: 
". . . No state shall 1nake or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws." 
Under the foregoing constitutional provisions liberty 
includes the right to work and to sell one's services 
whe·rever and under what conditions he may choose. 
This right cannot be interfered with except for the public 
welfare and the evil to be corrected must be of a sub-
stantial nature before the libeTty of citizens may be 
restricted. 
In the case of Weaver v-s. Palmer Bros. Oompa;ny, 
270 U. S. 402, 70 L. Ed. 654, the State o:f Pennsylvania 
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had passed a statute prohibiting the use of '·'shoddy" as, 
a material to be used in 1nattresses. The Unite·d States 
Supreme Court made the following statements in holding 
the statute unconstitutional as an infringement of 
personal libeTty: 
""Legislative determina.tions express or im-
plied are entitled to great weight; but it is always 
open to interested parties to shovv that the legis-
lature has transgressed the limits of its power. 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
413, 67 L. ed. 322, 325, 28 A.L.R. 1321, 43 Sup·. Ct. 
Rep. 158. Invalidity may be shown by things 
which will be judicially noticed ( Quong Wing v. 
Kirkendall, 223 U. S·. 59, 64, 56 L. ed. 350, 352·, 32 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 192), or by facts established by evi-
dence." 
"Shoddy-filled comfortables made by appellee 
are useful articles for which there is much 
demand. And it is a matter of public concern that 
the production and sale of things necessary or 
convenient for use should not be forbidden. They 
are to be distinguishe·d from things that the state 
is deemed to have power to suppress as inherently 
dangerous. 
"Many states have enacted laws to regulate 
bedding for the protection of health. Legislation 
in Illinois (Laws 1915, p. 375) went beyond mere 
regulation and prohibited the sale of secondhand 
quilts or comfortables even when sterilized or 
when remade from sterilized secondhand materi-
als. In People v. Weiner, 271 Ill. 7 4, L.R .. A. 1916C, 
775, 110 N. E. 870, Ann. Cas.1917C, 1065, the state 
supreme court held that to prohibit the use of 
material not inherently dangerous and that might 
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be rende·red safe. by reasonable regulation trans-
gresses the constitutional protection of personal 
and property rights." 
"The constitutional guaranties may not be 
1nade to yield to mere convenience. Schlesinge·r 
v. Wisconsin, decided March 1, 1926, 270 U. S. 
230, ante, 557, 43 A. L. R. 1224, 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
260. The business here involved is legitimate and 
useful; and, while it is subject to all reasonable 
regulation, the absolute prohibition of the use of 
shoddy in the manufacture of comfortables is 
purely arbitrary and violates the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment. Adams v. Tanner, 
244 U. S .. 590, 596, 61 L. ed. 1336, 1343, L.R.A. 
1917F, 1163, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662, Ann. Cas. 
1917D, 973; ~I eyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 
67 L. ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 
625; Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 
504, 68 L. ed. 813, 32 A.L.R. 661, 44 Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 412." 
Freedom of contract was discussed by this court in 
the case of Block & Griff vs. Schwartz, 27 Utah 387, 76 
Pac. 22 (at pages 395 and 396 of the Utah Report). 
"The appellant, however, claims that the 
enactment interferes with and abridges his 
inalienable rights, as well as those of others in 
like situation, subjects of this commonwealth; and 
for his and their protection against the conse-
quences which naturally flow from such an enact-
ment he ap·peals to section 1, art. 14, of Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States, 
which, on this subject, p·rovides: 'No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
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States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.' F:or like 
reasons he appeals to section 1, art. 1, of the Con-
stitution of this State, which inter alia, provides; 
'All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to 
acquire, possess and protect prope·rty; . . . to 
assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances;' and also to 
section 7 of article 1, which provides: 'No persons 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law.' ·These constitutional pro-
visions constitute the supreme law of the common-
wealth upon this subject. To that law the execu-
tive, the legislative, and the judicial departments 
of the government alike must bow obedience, a.s 
well as every subject. It forbids the abridge·ment 
by the State of the p·rivileges and immunities of 
all citizens. Under its mandate no person can be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law, and every person is entitled to the 
equal protection of the laws, and may acquire 
property, possess and protect it, as well as defend 
his life and liberty. ~These are inherent and 
inalienable rights of citizens, and are constitu-
tional guaranties. An enactment, therefore, which 
deprives a person arbitrarily of his property, or 
of som.e part of his personal liberty, is just as 
much inhibited by the supreme law as one which 
would deprive him of life. And 'liberty,' in the 
sense in which the term is here employed, is not 
restricted to m.ere freedom from imprisonment, 
but it embraces the right of a person to use his 
God-given powers, employ his faculties, exercise 
his judgment in the affairs of life, a.nd to be free 
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in the enjoyment and disposal of his acquisitions, 
subject only to such restraints as are imposed by 
the law of the land for the public welfa,re. The 
word 'liberty,' as thus employed in the Constitu-
tions and understood in the United States, is a 
term of comprehensive scope. It embraces not 
only freedom from servitude and from imprison-
rnent and arbitrary restraint of person, but also 
all our religious, civil, political, and personal 
rights, including the right in each subject to pur-
chase, hold, and sell or dispose of property in the 
same way that his neighbor may; and of such 
liberties no one can be deprived except by due 
process of law." 
The following statement was made by this court in 
the case of McGrew vs. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 
203, 85 P. 2d. 608, the case involving the Utah Minimum 
Wage Law, (page 208 of the Utah Report): 
"Thus one may be said to have a special prop-
erty in his profession or calling by means of w·hich 
he makes his support, and he can be deprived of 
it only by due process of law. Blair v. Ridgely, 
41 Mo. 63, 173, 97 Am. Dec. 248. We refer to this 
because it is necessary to keep this broad and true 
meaning of property in mind when considering 
the constitutional questions here presented. The 
right to work, the right to engage in gainful occu-
pations, the right to receive compensation for 
one's work are essentially property rights. So 
too is the right to enjoy the benefits resulting 
from the work of one so employed. So also the. 
right to engage in commerce or in legitimate husi-
ness is p~rop·erty. '' 
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The ca8e of State ex rel Cox vs. the Boa.rd of Ed.uca.-
tion of Salt Lake City, 21 lTtah 401, involved the question 
of 'vhether or not the school board could require vaccina-
tion of pupils as a condition of attendance at school. 'The 
court held that under the epidemic conditions of that day 
such a requirement 'vas valid. The following however is 
a quotation by the court as to the extent of the police 
po".,.er: 
'· ~·The police power of a State is recognized 
by the courts to be one of wide sweep·. It is exer-
cised by the State in order to promote the health, 
safety, comfort, morals, and welfare of the public. 
The right to exercise this power is said to be 
inherent in the people of every free government. 
It is not a grant derived from or under any writ-
ten constitution. It is not, however, without limi-
tation, and it can not be invoked so as to invade 
the fundamental rights of a citizen. As a general 
proposition, it may be asserted that it is the pro:v-
ince of the Legislature to decide when the exi-
gency exists for the exercise of this power, but 
as to what are the subjects which come within it 
is evidently a judicial question.' Champer v. City 
of Greencastle, 138 Ind., 339; Blue v. Beach, 56 
N.E. Rep. 87; State v. Gebhardt, 145 Ind. 439." 
The following quotation is taken from the footnote 
page 1'228 of Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, Eighth 
Edition, Volume Two: 
'' ':The police power is not unlimited ... 
Wherever it is irnvoked in aid of any purpose of 
legislation1, such purpose or legislation must bear 
some de finite a.nd tangible relation to the health, 
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comfort, morals, welfare, or safety of the public.' 
Goldman v. Crowther, 147 Md. 282, 128 Atl. 50, 
38 A. L. R. 1455. See also Miller v. Board of 
l:>ublic Works, 195 c·al. 477, 234 Pac. 381, 38 A. L. 
1~. 1479." 
The following statement is from the same text, pages 
1236 and 1237: 
"Freedom of Contract. F'reedom of contract 
is not absolute. It is subject to reasonable legis-
lative regulation in the interest of public health, 
safety and morals, and, in a sense ·not resting 
merely on expediency, the public welfare. But 
restraints upon such freedom must not be arbi-
trary or unreasonable. Freedom is the general 
rule and restraint the exception. The legislative 
authority to abridge can be justified only by 
exceptional circumstances." 
We also refer to the case of H untworth vs. Ta'l1!ner, 
152 P. 523, quoted at page 30 of this brief and the 
case of Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 61 L. ed. 1336, 
quoted at page 33. In the first case the Supreme Court 
of the State of Washington held that a statute pro-
hibiting employment agencies from collecting fees from 
employees did not apply to an agency devoted exclu-
sively to the securing of employment for teachers. The 
second case held the same statute unconstitutional as 
applied to any employment agency. The United States 
Supreme Court stated that employment agencies were 
legitimate businesses which could not be prohibited under 
the police power. The court found that the p·rohibition 
of the collection of a fee from the employee was in effect 
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a destruction of the business. The quotations from these 
cases at pag-es 30, 33 of this brief further outline the 
limitation upon the police power of the state. 
It is our pos,ition that the anti-nepotism law when 
applied to personnel employed by school boards who 
a.re required to hold and who do hold certificates issued 
by the State Board of Education is unconstitutional. 
(b) Plaintiff has a;n established and vested right to 
seek employment and· make contracts in any 
school district of the state, which right may not 
be interfered with by statute. 
Section 53-2-15 provides for the issuance of certifi-
cates and diplomas to professional teachers and states 
that: 
"/Such certificates and diplomas shall be valid 
in any school district of the state in the depart-
ment of instruction or supervision for which they 
are issued." 
In the case of Scheibner vs. Baer (Pa. 1896) 34 Atl. 
193, the State s.uperintendent attempted to revoke· a 
teacher's certificate without g-iving the statutory ten 
days' notice and an op,portunity to be heard. The court 
held that the certificate was a right which could not be 
interfered with without due process of law. The court 
stated: 
" 'It is clear that any certificate granted to a 
teacher is a "license" (see section 12) to him to 
pursue a certain avocation, and to seek a certain 
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public ernployment, which without it, he cannot 
pursue or seek. That right, during the period for 
whieh the certificate is granted to him, is a valu-
able property in his hands, just as a right to 
practice as an attorney of a court is property in 
1he hands of him who has been admitted to it. 
Ex r>arte Steinrnan, 95 Pa. St. 220, 237. The 
annulment of a teacher's certificate is the des-
truction of his property. No man, in this state, 
can be deprived of his property except by a pro-
ceeding judicial in its nature, and as such involv-
ing as an indispensable requisite an opportunity 
of being heard. Id.; Brown v. Hummel, 6 Pa. St. 
86, 91; Craig v. Kline, 65 Pa. St. 399, 413; 
Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 479, 485; Phila-
delphia v. Scott, 81 Pa. St. 80, 89. That oppor-
tunity the act of 1854 (section 41) secures to a 
teacher in the provision for notice to him previous 
to the annulment of his certificate; for, as was 
pointed out by Mr. Justice Field in Windsor v. 
· MeV eigh, 93 U. S. 27 4, the requirement of notice 
necessarily implies the right to appear and to be 
heard. Remembering that the effect of an annul-
ment of a certificate, in the case of one whose pro-
fession is that of a public school teacher, and who 
has passed the period of life when he can turn his 
hand to anything, means the destruction of his 
livelihood, it is surely true that the notice and 
opportunity for hearing prescribed by the statute 
are conditions p.recedent to the exercise of the 
power of annulment given by it.' " 
(c) The control and supervision of the public school 
system is by our constitution vested in the State 
Board of Education and the anti-nepotism law 
is m conflict with such provision. 
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Se·ction S, ~\rtirle X of our constitution provides: 
HT·he general control and supervision of the 
public school system shall be vested in a State 
Board of Education, consisting of the Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction, and such other per-
sons as the Legislature· may provide." 
The framers of the constitution obviously intended 
that a State Board of Education should regulate the 
public school system and such matters as constitute 
Hgeneral control and supervision" may not be taken away 
from the State Board by an arbitrary statute disquali-
fying teachers holding certificates. 'The Legislature has, 
pursuant to the State Constitution, placed the matter of 
qualification of teachers in the hands of the State Board 
of Education. 'The Legislature is prohibited by the con-
stitution from interfering and the anti-nepotism statute, 
as applied to certified employees of school boards, is in 
violation of the constitution. 
(d) There is no necessity in the interest of the 
public wel fa.re for an a.nti-nepotism statute 
which prohibits the employment of teachers a.nd 
other personnel required by la.w to hold. certifi-
cates issued by the State Board of Education. 
As shown by the authorities cited under subdivision 
(a) above an interference with the right of employment 
is justified only when there is some public necessity. 
Since by constitutional and statutory provisions the only 
persons who may be employed as teachers or supervisors 
in school districts are those who have been approved and 
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certified by the State Board of Education there is no 
need for an anit-nepotism law covering such personnel. 
rrhe following statutes relate to the issuance of certifi-
eateH by the Board of Education. References are to Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. 
"53-2-12. General Powers and duties.- The 
general control and supervision of the public 
school system is vested in the state board of edu-
cation. It shall adopt rules and regulations to eli-
minate and prevent all unnecessary duplication o.f 
work or instruction in any branch or division of 
the public school system and shall require the 
governing boards of all hranches and divisions 
of the public school system to put the same into 
operation." 
"53-2-15. Certificates and diplomas - Pro-
fessional teachers - Employees of local boards 
of education. - The state board of education is 
hereby authorized and empowered to issue profes-
sional teachers' certificates and diplomas of high 
school, junior high school, grammar, primary and 
kindergarten grade ; and also to issue superin-
tendents' certificates and diplomas and super-
visors' certificates and diplomas. Such certifi-
cates and diplomas shall be valid in 0Jf11Y schoo.Z 
district of the state in the departm-ent of ins~truc­
tion or supervision for which they are issued. 
"The state board of education is also author-
ized and empowered to issue certificates to pe·r-
sons regularly employed by local boards of edu-
cation in classifications of service in the public 
school system other than those specified in the 
preceding paragraph." 
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'~53-2-16. Diplon1as valid for life - Qualifi-
cations of recipients. - Diplomas of ·all grades, 
including superintendents' and supervisors' di-
plomas, shall be issued only to professional 
teachers, superintendents or supervisors who 
have reached the age of twenty-three years, have 
had five years of successful teaching or super-
Yising experience in this state, exhibit satisfactory 
evidence of good Inoral character, are free from 
serious infectious or heredi ta.ry disease and are 
found to possess the requisite scholarship· and 
culture. These diplomas are valid for life, urnless 
recoked for cau,se._ or unless the holder allows a 
space of five consecuti.ve years to pass without 
following the pursua.nt of teaching or supervis-
ing." 
"53-2-17. Certificates - How long valid -
Issuance. - Certificates shall be of such rank 
and classification as the state hoard of education 
shall determine, and shall be valid for a period of 
not to exceed five years. Certificates may be is-
sued to app~licants who have not had the teaching 
or supervising experience in this state required 
for diplomas." 
"53-2-18. Scholarship qualifications of ap·-
plicants - Change. - The state board of educa-
tion shall determine the scholarship. and training 
required of applicants for diplomas, and the 
scholarship, training and experience required of 
applicants for certificates; provided, tha.t any 
change made by the state board of education by 
which the scholarship·, training or experience re-
quired for any certificate or d:iploma. is increased 
shall be a.nnounced when made, and shall be effec-
tive not less than one year from the date when 
such change is awnounced." 
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4
'53-2-19. Certificates and diplomas from cer-
tain institutions acceptable. - Certificates and 
di plo1nas issued by the school of education of the 
LT niversi.ty of Utah, when indorsed by the chair-
uuul of the state board of education, shall have 
the force of certificates and diplomas of corres-
ponding rank issued ·by the state board of educa-
tion. rrhe state board of education may accept 
er<~dits, certificates and diplomas of other insti-
tutions of learning as meeting in whole or in part 
the require1nents for teachers' certificates and 
diplo1nas, if the work of such institutions of learn-
ing is found to conform to standards fixed by the 
state board of education." 
•'53-2-20. Applicants fro1n other states. -
The state board of education 1nay issue certifi-
cates and diplon1as to persons holding certificates 
and di plo1nas fron1 other states; provided, such 
certificates and diplomas are found to be of equal 
rank 'Yith those issued by this state; and provided 
further, that applicants for diplomas shall have 
taught successfully at least five years, of which 
at least two years shall have been in Utah." 
"53-2-21. Teachers, supervisors and superin-
tendents to have certificate. - No person shall 
teach in a public school or be employed as super-
visor or superintendent in any school district in 
this state and receive compensation therefor out 
of any public jtunds who a.t the time of 
rendering such service or at the time of such emr 
ployment is not the holder of a certificate issued 
in accordance with the regulations of the state 
boa.rd of education; provided, that this section 
shall not apply to substitutes employed to take 
the place of regular teachers who are temporarily 
absent." 
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"53-2-:2~. Exa1nination of applicants. - The 
state board of education 1na:y deter1nine by exaini-
nation or othervvise the qualifications of appli-
cants for certificates and diplomas, prepare ex-
an1ination questions, appoint representatives in 
the seve·ral districts of the state to conduct ex-
aminations, and prescribe all necessary rules and 
regulations relative to examinations." 
H53-2-23. Examiners - Compensation. -
The state board of education may appoint persons 
of eminent educational ability to assist in the 
preparation of examination questions and the 
grading of examination papers and fix the com-
pensation for such p·ersons, which shall be paid 
from 1noney appropriated for the p·urpose upon 
vouchers approved by the state board of ex-
aminers." 
"53-2-24. Revocation of certificates -
Grounds. - The state board of education shall re-
voke for immoral or unprofessional condu.ct or 
evident ~unfitness for teaching state diploma-s a.nd 
state certificates issued under the provisions of 
this chapter." 
"53-2-25. Teachers in district schools 1nust 
be physically and mentally fit.- No person shall 
be employed by any board of education as teacher 
in any school district in this state and receive 
compensation therefor out of any public funds 
who is mentally or physically disqualified to per-
form successfully the: duties of a teache-r, by rea-
son of tuberculosis or any other chronic or acute 
disease. Any board of education may require any 
applicant for employment as a teacher to furnish 
satisfactory evidence· tha.t he or she is mentally 
and physically qualified for the duties of a 
teacher." 
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Exhibit "A" (pamphlet attached to complaint con-
sisting of 35 pages) contains the rules and regulations 
adopted by the State Board of Education covering re-
quireinenb.; for teachers, supervisors and superintend-
ent:--;. Pages 3 to 18 cover the significant matters relating 
to principals and high school teachers, in which classifi-
cation plaintiffs fall. We suggest that these rules and 
regulations be earefully read if theTe is any question as 
to whether or not the requirements have been well con-
sidered. F'or a statement of the history and evaluation 
of the requirement~ of the State Board of Education we 
suggest that the court take judicial notice of "The His-
tory of Public Education in Utah" by John Clifton 
~foffitt, ( 1946) pages 308 to 313. The author concludes 
with the following general statement as to the require-
ments in 1946 which are substantially the present re-
quirements as outlined in Exhibit "A". 
"Current practice in teacher certification. -
No teacher, supervisor or superintendent may be 
employed to work in an educational capacity of 
public school work ,and receive compensation un-
less he or she is 'the holder of a certificate issued 
in accordance with the regulations of the State 
Board of Education.' The state board has oper-
ated on a long-time planning program and 
throughout the years of its existence has raised 
the standards to their present status. The present 
requirements were announced sufficiently in ad-
vance to p·ermit teachers to pre·pare themselves 
to meet the higher demands for ·certification. 
Present regulations became· effective September 
1, 194'2. The teachers are certified in three major 
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categories: general secondary, general eleinen-
tary and special subject certificates. First and 
second class rertifieates are awarded in each of 
the above rlassifications. First class certificates 
are valid for five years and renewable for five-
year periods upon the completion of seven and 
one-half quarter hours of acceptable upper divi-
sion college \York. Second class certificates are 
awarded in eaeh of the three, categories, and are 
valid for t'vo years. Likewise, these are renewable 
on the completion of seven and one-half hours of 
credit of upper division college work. The second 
class certificates are issued to those individuals 
'vho have training below the standard established 
and effective September 1, 1942, and pertains par-
ticularly to those teaehers or teacher candida,tes 
required to hold certificates who have not ob-
tained a Bachelor's Degree or the equivalent 
thereof. General secondary certificates are, valid 
in four-year high schools, and in junior and sen-
ior high schools, and general elementary certifi-
cates are valid in all elementary grades. In addi-
tion to four years of college training, upon first 
receiving the certificate the candidate is required 
to present speeified training, ineluding major 
areas of study. Music, art, and the· commercial 
subjects may be taught by those who hold special 
subject certificates. Requirements for re~newal 
are comparable to those for the general certifi-
cate. In addition to the general and special sub-
ject certificates listed, librarians, coordinators, in-
dustrial arts teachers and teachers of vocational 
agriculture, vocational trade, and industrial edu-
cation, as well as those teaching home economics, 
are awarded certificates requiring special study. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
"'Those working in administrative and super-
vi:..;ory positions are required to hold appropriate 
<'Prtificates in their field. All public school super-
int(~ndentH, and all principals of schools with three 
or 1nore teachers, must hold administrative certi-
f'i('ate:..;. Likewise, supervisors in both secondary 
:..;<· hools and elernentary schools should hold cer-
tifieates appropriate to the school level they serve. 
Ad1ninistrative and supervisory certification is 
given upon the basis of experience and training. 
"In order to stimulate professional growth, 
the :..;tate board of education has discontinued the 
forn1er practice of issuing life diplomas, but rec-
ognizes tho~e that have been awarded preceding 
the date of the present policy - providing the 
holder of such a diploma does not permit five con-
secutiYe years to elapse without serving as a regu-
lar teacher or supervisor. The ·state board at its 
own choice 1nay revoke or refuse to issue any cer-
tificate for just cause. During 1945, state ap-
pointed representative groups were at work pre-
paratory to making further n1odification in all 
divisions of certification." 
Fron1 the foregoing and an exan1ination of Exhibit 
''A" it is apparent that the State Board of Education ac-
tively supervises and regulates the issuance of teaching 
and supervisory certificates. A high standard is main-
tained and the State Board does all of the "policing" 
necessary in the interest of public welfare. There is no 
legitimate basis under the police power of the state to 
interfere with the supervision of the public school system 
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by the State Board of Education or to nullify the statu-
tory provision \Yhich 8tates that certificates issued by the 
State Board shall be valid in all school districts. 
In addition to the control and supervision by the 
State Board of Education 've consider it worthy of notice 
that lmder Section 52-3-1 (the anti-nepotisin law) prior 
to its amendn1ent by the 1953 Legi,slature the Board mem-
ber related to the teacher was prohibited from voting on 
the employment of such teacher. It was therefore a re-
quirement that a majority of the Board should vote for 
the employment of the teacher without the vote of the 
related member. This has been an additional safeguard 
in the employment of teaching personnel. 
(e) The anti-nepotism law is arbitrary art~d oppres-
sive arnd u.nduly restricts the liberty of plaintiffs 
guaranteed by the stat·e and federal constitu-
tions. 
The ease of Huntworth v. Tanner (Wash. 1915) 152 
Pac. 5·23, was an action by the plaintiff doing business as 
the Pacific Teachers Agency to enjoin the defendant, 
Attorney General, from enforcing a law prohibiting em-
ployment agencies fro1n charging the employees for ser-
vices in securing employment. The court construed the 
st~atute as not app,lying to employment agencies re-
stricted to the employment of teachers and an injunction 
was granted. On the question of statutory construction 
and the police po,ver of the state, the court said : 
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"If thus construed, it might well be ques-
tioned whether the law would be constitutional-
granting for present purposes that the act in 
wholP or in part does no violence to the fourteenth 
alltencltnent to the c·onstitution of the United 
~~Hates, a question upon which we make no ruling; 
for an act of the character of the one now before 
us, in so far as it affects individuals who may 
have eonducted a legitimate business fairly and 
honestly, would be clearly unconstitutional unless 
it can be said that the abuses growing out of the 
conduct of a certain kind of a business are so 
great as to warrant a holding that the general 
welfare demands that the innocent must limit or 
give up their calling for the common good. Such 
laws are sustained, not because a business is in 
itself unlawful, but because of the abuses attend-
ing its operation. Consequently it is in the abuses, 
and not the business that the law is rooted. The 
police power touches those things which offend 
against the welfare of society. It finds no resting 
place in that which is inoffensive. If the act be 
construed as to include 'any person' who may ac-
cept a fee for procuring employment for another 
without qualification and without reference to 
the mischiefs declared in the preamble and sought 
to be remedied by the st~atute, it would be, an un-
reasonable restraint, and probably be overturned 
in its entirety. 
"'The test of the (police) powe~r is found in 
the effect the pursuit of the calling has upon the 
public weal, rather than in the inherent nature of 
the calling itself.' State ex rel. D~avis-Smith v. 
Claus en, 65 Wash. 1'56, 19'2, 117 Pac. 1101, 1112 
(37 L.R.A. (N."S.) 466)." 
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In the case of Saville v. Corless, ±G Utah 495, 151 
Pac. 51, this court held uncon·stitutional as not within 
the police po,Yer of the state a statute requiring mercan-
tile and cormnercial institutions to rlose at 6:00 o'clock 
P.:\1. of every business day excepting six days prior to 
Christmas. The follo,ving is a portion of the, c.ourt's 
op1n1on: 
._,, ... e think it also offends against constitu-
tional rights to enjoy, acquire and possess prop-
erty, the most valuable of which is that of aliena-
tion, the right to vend and sell. There are things 
the sale of 'vhich may be restricted, regulated, or 
even prohibited by the Legislature, and enter-
prises which may be restricted, regulated and con-
trolled. But such legal interference must rest on 
the police power of the state to promote or p~re­
serve public health, public m·orals, public safety, 
public convenience, and general welfare. The· act 
here has no such purpose and in no sense tends 
to promote or preserve public health, morals, 
peace, order, safety, convenience, comfort or wel-
fare. It is but an arbitrary and an unwarranted 
interference with a merchant's business. One or a 
number of 1nerchants may desire to close their 
stores at six o'clock. They may do that. But they, 
by legisl~ation, cannot eompel every other mer-
chant to close at the sa1ne hour. They can run 
their own business, but not their neighbor's. So 
employees, for motives of their own, may desire 
all store~s to close at a certain hour. But their em-
ployers, whose business and property is affected, 
have a voice in that. ·They, if they choose, may 
consent to close. But they cannot, by legislation, 
or otherwise, be coerced to do so. An employee 
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1uay refuse to work for another after six o'clock. 
r:L,hat i~ hi~ right. But he may not by legislation 
or otherwise, vrevent his enlploye; from conduct-
ing hi~ own business in person, or with other em-
plo~·ees who are willing to work for him. That is 
an unwarranted interference with the rights of 
others. All thi~ is so self-evident and fundamental 
as not to ad.Init of argument. Most sweeping 
a1uenu1n<lnts to both the federal and state C:on-
stit utions are essential to sanction such legisla-
tion as indica ted in either the title or body of the 
act hPfore us. If there be one thing more than 
others to be guarded against encroachment it is 
the federal and state Constitutions. These we are 
all sworn to protect and defend. To disobey them 
i.')· to jeopardize fundanzental rights and liberties 
of the }Jeople, inzperil their welfare and happiness, 
and to Jnenace tlze rery existence of governments." 
In the case of State ex rel Robinson v. Keefe (Fla. 
1933) 149 So. 638, the plaintiffs, school teachers, brought 
suit to nullify the anti-nepotisn1 statute prohibiting the 
en1ployn1ent of school 'teachers related to members of 
boards of education. ..A.s shown in another portion of this 
brief (page 36) the court construed the statute as not 
applying to teachers holding certificates from the state 
board of education. However the court indicated that 
an anti-nepotism statute which does apply to teachers 
holding certificates "'"ould not be within the constitutional 
powers of the Legislature. The court stated: 
"The requirements of this separate code of 
laws (with regard to teachers' certificates) afford 
adequate protection against appointments other 
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than upon proved 1nerit, U'hich is all tha,t a,n • a.nti-
nepotis·m' law can constitnti.onally be snppose.d 
to cover and still re1na.in within the police powef· 
nnder the guise of 1clzich it is enacted." 
.A .. t this point "\Ye refer the court to subdivision (a) 
above "\Yhich sets forth cases defining the limit of the 
police power of the state. \\T e particularly call attention 
to the case of .... -ldanz.s v. Tan;ner, 2-!4: U. S·. 590, 61 L. Ed. 
1336 'vhich involved the same statute as the Washington 
case of Huntworth v. T'anner, supra. The United States 
Supreme Court in this case held the Washington statute 
prohibiting an en1ployment agency from charging the 
employee (whether teachers or any e1nployees) for its 
services unconstitutional as an interference with indi-
vidual liberty. 
There is no necessity in the public welfare to pro-
hibit the employment of a teacher or supervisor having a 
license to teach in the form of a certificate issued by the 
state board of education.~ lAs stated in the case of State 
ex rel. Robinson v. Keefe, supra, anti-nepotism statutes 
are for the purpose of preventing the employment of in-
competent relatives. Since the question of qualification 
is adequately handled by the State Board of Education 
the anti-nepotism statute when applied to school teachers 
is an unwarranted interference with liberty, is arbitrary 
and a violation of the privileges of citizens. 
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We again refer the court specifically to the case of 
._'-{clteilnu~r r. Baer quoted at page 19 of this brief where 
it is held that the certificate of the teacher is a "license" 
whieh eannot he revoked without just cause and by due 
p ro<'e:-;~ of law. 
As a further counnent we mention the present situa-
tion of the schools of this state of which this -court may 
takP judicial notice. rreachers are leaving the State of 
l .. tah becau~e of lo\v salaries and uncertainty of con-
tracts. Obviously the effect of disqualifying a large num-
ber of teachers fron1 teaching in the districts where they 
have become well established will result in more te·achers 
leaving the state or changing their profession or occupa-
tion. There 1nay he so1ne inducement to continue if a 
teacher n1ay continue to teach in the district in which he 
is now employed even though salaries may be low. If 
however the teacher is required to seek employment else-
where it is an invitation to leave the state for higher 
pay or start ane,v, leaving the teaching profession. It is 
self-evident that a teacher who has spent twenty or thirty 
years of his life in one district may not be able to secure 
employment in another district either within o~ without 
the State of Utah. But if he must seek employment else-
where and if he can find employment in the teaching 
profession he may as easily find it outside of the State 
of Utah. The arbitrary disqualification because of are-
lationship to one board member may very well be the 
impelling force to cause a well-qualified teacher to seek 
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professional employn1ent in a state where he will not be 
plagued with the problems of low salary and well-mean-
ing relatives elected to boards of education. 
II. ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE SHOULD BE CONSTRUED 
SO AS NOT TO APPLY TO TEACHERS AND OTHER 
EMPLOYEES OF BOARDS OF EDUCATION REQUIRED 
BY LAW TO HAVE CERTIFICATES OR DIPLOMAS IS-
SUED BY THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
Under Point No. I we have contended and it is still 
our contention that the anti-nepotism statute as amended 
by the 1953 Legislature is unconstitutional. This is for. 
the reason that there is no specific exemption made. with 
regard to employees of local hoards of education holding 
certificates issued by the State Board of Education, and 
the statute is not warranted under the. police power of 
the state. 
Nevertheless there is authority for the proposition 
that the Legislature may not have intended to include 
employees required by law to hold certificates as a 
requisite to employment. We submit the following 
authorities on this question. For convenience we have 
divided this argument into subheadings (a), (b) and 
(c). As under Point No. I we think there is a logical 
segregation of points but the matte~rs are necessarily 
overlapping and authorities cited under one of these 
subdivisions may be persuasive under another subdivi-
sion or under all three. 
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(a) 1 f so construed the anti-nepotism statute is in 
conflict with Section 53-2-15, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953. 
N<~etion 53-~-15, after authorizing the State Board 
() r l~:d ll('a t ion to issue certificates to professional teach-
(•r:-;, ~upervison.;, et('., provides: 
"Su(·h certificates and diplomas shall be valid 
in any school district of the state in the depart-
nten t of instruction or supervision for which they 
art· issued." 
The anti-nepotisn1 statute as applied to employees 
of local boards of education holding certificates from 
the State Board of Education nullifies Section 53-2-15, 
~ince the right to teach is denied the holder of the certifi-
cate in the districts \\'here there is a member of the 
board related to the teacher within the degrees men-
tioned. 
(b) Stat-utes 1nust be construed in the light of their 
intent and purposes. 
The case of State ex rel. Robinson vs. Keefe (Fla. 
1933) 149 So. 638, is in our opinion directly in point. The 
Florida statute involved in that case was as follows: 
"Section 1. That any State Officer, membe·r 
of State Board, County Officer, member of 
County Board or Commission, City Official, or 
his appointee, who shall knowingly employ, either 
directly or indirectly, any p·erson related within 
the fourth degree, either by consanguinity or by 
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affinity, to such State Officer, me1nber of State 
. Board, County Officer, 1nember of c·ounty Board 
or Commission, (_'iity Official, or his appointee 
shall be deemed guilty of 1nisfea.sance and mal-
feasance in office and subject to removal therefor. 
Provided, ho,vever, that the provision of this Act 
shall not apply to officers above who employ only 
one person related to hin1 as above set out. 
"S.ection 2. That any State Officer, member 
of State Board, County Officer, member of 
County Board or Con11nission, City Official, or 
his appointee, violating the provisions of Section 
One of this Act shall forfeit all compens~tion 
salary, fees or emolmnents of such office during 
the time that such State Officer, member of State 
Board, County Officer, member of County Board 
or c·ommission, City Official or his appointee 
violates the provision of this Act. 
"Section 3. All laws or parts of laws In 
conflict herewith are hereby repealed." 
As can be readily seen from the foregoing there 
\Yas no specific exception of school teachers. Section 3 
of the foregoing act also stated that all laws in conflict 
with the anti-nepotism statute "are hereby repealed." 
The Florida laws, similar to our own laws, required 
teachers to secure certificates from the state board of 
education and the laws provided that such certificates 
should be valid in all districts of the state. The court 
made the following statement in exempting teachers 
from the provisions of the anti-nepotism law: 
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" 'N epotistn' has been defined as the bestowal 
of 1 >a tronage by public officers in appointing 
othPrs to offices or positions by reason of their 
hlood or marital relationship to the appointing 
authority, rather than because of the merit or 
ability of' the apvointee. The Florida act should 
IH~ C'Onstrued in the light of its obvious purpose to 
di:·woul'age 'nepotism' as above defined. 
"And as so con trued, act~ of similar import 
have been either definitely sustained as constitu-
tional, or have been enforced by the courts with-
out serious controversy as to their validity, in at 
least two other states, although authorities relat-
ing to such statutes are few. See Barton v. 
Alexander, 27 Idaho 286, 148 Pac. 471, Ann. Cas. 
1917 D, 729; Redell v. State, 14 Okla. Cr. 199, 170 
Par. 273; State ex rel. Ikard v. Russell, Judge, 
33 Okla. 141, 124 Pac. 1092. 
"The la-w"S of Florida relating to the nomina-
tion and employn1ent of school teachers are coln-
plete in then1selves. No intention is manifest in 
the 1933 'anti-nepotis1n' law, above mentioned, to 
repeal or 1nodi:fy the general school laws of this 
state relating to exanrination, certification, and 
e1nployment of only qualified school teachers on 
the basis of their demonstrated merit as attested 
by the fact of their certificates, as distinguished 
from e·mployn1ent based largely on the basis of 
the appointee's domestic relation, or relationship 
by consanguinity or affinity, toward officers 
vested with the appointing authority. 
"Our construction of the school statutes is 
that under these laws. teachers are required to be 
appointed because of their demonstrated and 
proved ability to teach, or because of their past 
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practical experience in teaching, and not by reason 
of their family status, or the usual political con-
siderations that may apply to the ordinary civil 
offices or positions which are permitted to be 
filled at the discretion of the appointing power 
as a means of personal reward to kins1nen or as 
recon1pence to the politically faithful. 
"So the reason for not applying a statute of 
this kind to a class of appointees such as school 
teachers, whose n1erit 1nust be established before 
they are permitted to be employed at all, is found 
in the fact that the Legislature has by other com-
plete statutes not in terms modified or repealed 
by this one, provided a special system for the 
appointment and tenure of employment for school 
teachers. The require1nents of this sepa.rate code 
of la.ws afford adequate proteqtion aga.inst ap-
pointments other tha.n upon proved merit, which 
is all that an (anti-nepotism' la.w can constitu.-
tionally be supposed to cover a.nd still remain 
within the police power, under· the guise of which 
it is enacted." 
We also refer the court to the case of Hruntworth 
vs. Tanner, 152 Pac. 526, at page 30 of this brief 
where the court construed a statute with regard to 
employment agencies as not applying to an agency 
exclusively engaged in securing employment for teachers. 
In the case of Golding vs. Schubach Optical Com.-
pa.ny, 93 Utah 32, 70 P. 2d. 871, injunction proceedings 
had been commenced by the director of the Department 
of Registration of the State of Utah against the defend-
ants to prohibit the carrying on of the busine·ss of 
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optoHlPtt·y whPre licensed optometrists were employed 
by eorporations and the corporations advertised the per-
l'orulanee of this service. In holding that the corporation 
<'ould carry on the business so long as the service was 
a<·t ua1ly }Wrfortued by the licensed optometrist the court 
~ 't:d . 
• ( J - • 
..rrhe right to Hell one's services, to accept 
<'Blployinent at a ~alary, and the right to buy 
another's serYice, to ernploy another at a salary, 
are funda1nental rights, limited only by the terms 
of the contract that may be made between the 
parties, except where the work to be done is 
fraught \\'"ith a public· interest, and the state has 
spoken, and ~et the limitations necessary to pro-
tect the public interest. 
"The state has spoken on the subject of 
opto1netry and opto1netrists, not for the purpose 
of conferring any special privilege upon optome-
tists, nor to put any special restrictions upon them, 
but to preserve and protect the public against 
quacks and charlatans, who, however incompetent 
they might be, \Vould prey upon the desire and 
necessity of the people to protect their eyesight. 
Chapter 11 of title 79, R.S. tTtah 1933 (the statute 
referring to optometry), was enacted by the 
Legislature because that body felt that the pro-
tection of eyesight was of public concern, and 
one not qualified should not be permitted to exam-
ine eyes and diagnose and prescribe treatment, or 
types of glasses, to cure the defe-cts, or preserve 
the failing sight. The act mu.st therefore be con-
strued in the light of the purzJoses back of its 
enactm.en.t; that is, as a me-asure to protect the 
health and eyesight of the p·eople, and when this 
purpose is accomplished, it is not within the 
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province or po,ver of the court to extend it beyond 
such purposes; or to read into it son1ething not 
designed to protect the public interest and health, 
but to grant Inonopolies, regulate private busi-
ness or relationships, grant special privile·ges, or 
curtail the nor1nal hun1an rights and liberties." 
The following statement is taken fron1 the case of 
Uta.h Association. of Life Underwriters vs. Mountain 
States Life lns1Jrance Company, 58 Utah 579, 200 Pac. 
673 (at page 589 of the Utah Report): 
"It is elementary doctrine in this jurisdiction 
that statutes must be construed and applied in 
furtherance of the purpose or obje.ct which 
induced their adoption. That the statutes govern-
ing life insurance contracts must be liberally con-
strued, and so as to protect the public, is held by 
all the courts having statutes that are like or 
similar to ours. See Joyce on Insurance ('2d Ed.) 
Sec. 190e. The language of our statute is very 
broad and comprehensive, and a mere cursory 
reading of it discloses its dominant intent and 
purpose. Moreover, we· have a right to assume 
that every provision of the statute which is pro-
hibitive in its effect is based upon some evil 
which, in the minds of the Legislature, required 
regulation. Then, again, it is manifest that the 
statute was enacted for the protection of the pub-
lic and especially for the protection of those who 
are solicited to enter into life insurance contracts 
who may lack the experience and the opportunity 
to guard themselves against the wiles of the 
experienced life insurance solicitor. The statute 
should therefore be construed so as to accomplish 
its purpose and so as to pTotect those it intends 
to protect." 
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(e) Where there a.re two possible constructions to 
he given a statute one of which results in the 
slal1de beinq held unconstitutional, the alterna-
tin(~ construction should be given. 
Th i ~ point is also emphasized in the case of H wnt-
wurllt r.~,·. Tarnter eited at page 30 of this brief. 
In tiH~ <·cu-;e of University of Utah vs. Richards, 20 
TTtah -1-57, 59 J>a<·. 96, this court 1nade the following 
sta te1nen t (at page -J.(;~) of the lT tah Report) : 
.. The lR\\T makers did not see fit to embrace 
in the latter any express words of repeal of the 
forn1er act. If such former act is repealed, it must 
be by i1nplication. If the acts are repugnant or 
are so irreconcilably in conflict with each other 
and cannot be harn1onized togethe·r, in order to 
effectuate the purpose of their enactment, then 
it n1ay be said the later act may by implication 
repeal the for1ner. Repeals by implication, how-
ever, are not favored by the law. One act is not 
to be allo,ved to defeat another if by reasonable 
construction the two can be made to stand to-
gether.'' 
III. WHERE BOARD OF EDUCATION RECEIVES NO PAY 
THE ANTI-NEPOTISM STATUTE IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
To come 'vithin the literal wording of the anti-
nepotism statute both the· employer and the employee 
must be receiving pay out of public funds. The violation 
of the statute is a misdemeanor. Being penal it must 
be strictly construed. Members of boards of education 
do not necessarily receive pay out of public funds. 
S·ection 53-6-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides: 
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~'Board 1nen1bers - Con1pensation and ex-
penses.-The 1nen1bers of each board of educa-
tion shall fix the con1pensation to be received for 
their se rYices ; in city school districts at a su1n 
not to exceed $100 each per annum; and in county 
school districts at a Slun not to exceed $150 each 
per annum and traveling expenses not to exceed 
$100 each per annum; provided, in county school 
districts any Ineinber living n1ore than 75 miles 
from the place of 1neeting 1nay receive· not to 
exceed $200 per annun1 for traveling expenses, 
and each board n1ember shall be required to sub-
Init an itemized account of traveling expenses, 
sworn to by him and approved by the board." 
This is not a situation where the school board 
member is sin1ply refusing to accept his pay but the 
school board itself, pursuant to statute·, must determine 
what pay, if any, the members shall receive. As pointed 
out in the statement of facts the Board of Education of 
Ogden City has passed a resolution fixing the pay for 
the me1nbe-rs of the board for the school year 1953-1954 
at nothing. In the case of Tanner vs. Bateman, in addi-
tion to all of the arguments heretofore 1nade in this brief, 
there is the argument that since the board members in 
Ogden City will receive no pay the statute does not 
cover employees of that board. 
It may be argued that the last clause of the statute 
relating only to the acceptance of employment by the 
appointee does not require that both the board membe-r 
and the employee be paid out of public funds. This 
clause is as follows: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
B and it is unlawful for such appointee to 
ac·c·Ppt or to retain such e,mployrnent in all cases 
where the dire~t power of employment or appoint-
lltent to such position is or can be exercised by 
any person within the degrees of consanguinity 
or af'finit~, h<·rein specified, or by a board or 
group of' \\·hi<·h such person is a member." 
'1.,11<' \vords "suc·h position" refer to the first part of the 
~Petion whjc·l1 spec-ifically states that the position is one 
\\'heru hoth of the related persons must receive pay out 
of public funds. 
\Yhile there is no factual situation now before the 
court involving the question of hiring employees not 
required to hold certificates by the Board of Education 
'vhere a 1ne1nber of the board is a relative of such 
e1nployee, such personnel 1nay be affected by a ruling 
of the court on the point herein presented. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the position of the plaintiff that the act of the 
1953 Legislature in a1nending Section 52-3-1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, is invalid as a violation of the stat~ and 
federal constitutions and not within the police power 
of the state. This for the reason that by its terms it 
prohibits the e1nployment of teachers and other personnel 
required by law to hold certificates issued by the, State 
Board of Education and as to such employees there is 
no basis in the interest of the public vvelfare to warrant 
the interference with individual liberty and the right to 
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seek employ1nent \Yherever a citizen uu1y choose. The 
act of the Legislature is further unconstitutional as an 
atten1pt to take fron1 the State Board of Edueation the 
general control and supervision of the public school 
system conferred by Section 8, Article X of our State 
Constitution. 
As a rnatter of statutory construction it n1ay be that 
the Legislature did not intend Section 52-3-1 to apply to 
school teachers and other personnel required by law to 
secure certificates from the State Board of Education 
as a prerequisite to being en1ployed by local boards of 
education. If such construction be given to the anti-
nepotism statute, plaintiffs (as in the case of unconsti-
tutionality of the statute) are entitled to a writ of 
mandamus requiring the respective local boards of edu-
cation to enter into contracts for the year 1953-1954. 
As a further basis for the ernployment of the 
plaintiff ~Iathias C. Turner, his employment will con-
stitute no violation of the anti-nepotism law for the 
reason that 1nen1bers of the Board of Education of Ogden 
City for the fiscal year 1953-1954 will be entitled to 
receive no compensation from public funds. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARR., WILKINS & CANNON, 
PAUL B. C.ANNON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs. 
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